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Handbook updates 
For those of you subscribing to the handbook, the following updates 
are included.
Cash Corn and Soybean Prices – A2-11 (4 pages) 
Deductible Livestock Costs for Adjusting Income Tax Returns – 
B1-15 (1 page) 
Please add these files to your handbook and remove the out-of-date 
material.
continued on page 6
China’s new nationwide E10 ethanol 
mandate and its global implications
By Minghao Li, Postdoctoral researcher, Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University; Wendong Zhang, extension 
economist, 515-294-2536, wdzhang@iastate.edu; Dermot Hayes, 
Professor of Economics and Professor of Finance, Iowa State University
In September 2017, the Chinese government announced a new nationwide ethanol mandate 
(National Energy Administration 
2017) that expands the mandatory 
use of E10 fuel (gasoline 
containing 10 percent ethanol) 
from 11 trial provinces to the 
entire country by 2020. This 
measure would require the fuel 
ethanol consumption in China, 
the largest motor vehicle market 
in the world, to at least quadruple 
within the next three years. 
For U.S. producers, this recent 
development fuels interest in 
whether China is going to import 
ethanol and/or corn (the main 
feedstock for ethanol production 
in China) to meet the mandate. 
Background 
A key motivation for the E10 
mandate is to reduce China’s large 
corn stockpiles, which peaked in 
2015 at over four billion bushels 
(Figure 1). This is about half 
of the world ending stocks and 
enough for China’s domestic 
consumption for half a year (Wu 
and Zhang 2016). The stockpile is 
the result of a corn price support 
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Figure 1. China’s end-of-year corn stock estimates 
(2017/2018 values forecasted)  
(Source: USDA FAS: world market and trade)
policy that was paying Chinese 
corn producers more than twice 
the international 
price level until 
2016 (Wu and 
Zhang 2016). 
Burdened by high 
storage cost, food 
safety risks, and 
potential waste, 
China recently 
adopted multiple 
measures to 
cut supply and 
increase demand. 
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China’s new nationwide E10 ethanol mandate and its global implications, continued from page 1
These measures include replacing the support price 
with a producer support based on area planted 
and financial assistance for corn processors. These 
measures have been effective—since 2015, China’s 
corn consumption has caught up with production, 
the price for corn dropped to the lowest point in six 
years, and ending stock has been decreasing (USDA 
2017b). The E10 mandate will further increase the 
demand for corn and speed up reduction of the 
stockpile.
Another important motivation for China’s E10 
mandate is to curb air pollution and Green House 
Gas (GHG) emissions created by China’s 194 million 
cars. As a replacement for gasoline, ethanol has the 
potential to cut down CO2, particulate matter, and 
other pollutants. (However, the U.S. experience has 
revealed the potential unintended consequences 
from corn ethanol, such as land-use change induced 
by increased energy crop production [Wright et al. 
2007] and water pollution from increased fertilizer 
use [New York Times, 2010], which might be at odds 
with China’s efforts to cut corn acreage and improve 
water quality.) China views the recent E10 mandate 
as a step toward reducing smog and fulfilling its 
commitments to the Paris Climate Agreement 
(Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015).
Current situation of China’s ethanol industry 
In 2016, China was the fourth-largest ethanol 
producing country/region in the world, after the 
United States, Brazil, and the European Union. From 
2004 to 2016, the average annual production growth 
rate was 16.8 percent.
Corn is China’s main feedstock (called Generation 
1, see Figure 1) for ethanol production, currently 
accounting for 64 percent of total output.1 The four 
state-owned corn ethanol producers, located in corn 
producing regions in northern China (Figure 3), 
were established after the regional trial started in 
2002, following a historical peak in corn stockpile. 
As the stockpile decreased and refineries started 
to use newly harvested corn for feedstock, the 
government stopped approving additional Generation 
1 ethanol refineries in 2007 (CDRC 2007). By 
calling for “appropriate development of grain-based 
ethanol,” the current national E10 mandate relaxes 
the government’s previous stance against corn-based 
ethanol. 
After China halted the development of Generation 
1 ethanol in 2006, it shifted support to “Generation 
1.5” feedstock, such as cassava and sweet sorghum. 
Cassava, a tuberous starchy root commonly 
grown in tropical and sub-tropical areas, became 
the second largest source of feedstock, currently 
accounting for 23 percent of total output. However, 
it is challenging to grow enough Generation 1.5 
feedstock domestically, and cassava refineries in 
China still heavily rely on imports (IEA Bioenergy 
2016). Cassava refineries are located in southern 
China, close to domestic and foreign cassava 
production regions (Figure 3). Recently, China has 
been encouraging ethanol production using cellulosic 
feedstock (called Generation 2). However, cellulosic 
ethanol production is not expected to reach large 
scale production until 2025 (NEA 2017).
The production and distribution of ethanol in China 
is integral to the regional E10 trial program. Trial 
areas, selected based on proximity to production, 
expanded from several cities in 2002 to six provinces 
and more than 30 cities today. State-approved ethanol 
refineries are exclusive suppliers in the nearby trial 
areas. They sell ethanol to designated state-owned 
fuel companies at 91.11 percent of market gasoline 
wholesale price. The fuel companies then blend 
ethanol with gasoline, and distribute the resulting 
E10 fuel in the trial areas where only E10 fuel is 
allowed to be sold. 
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Figure 2. China’s ethanol supply (2017 value forecasted)  
(Source: USDA: China biofuel annual, 2017)
1 In 2016, Generation 1 and Generation 1.5 made up 92 percent of  
 total output, while Generation 2 made up 8 percent (USDA 2017a,  
 table 5). In the previous year, corn and cassava made up 70 percent  
 and 25 percent of Gen 1 + Gen 1.5 output, respectively.
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China’s new nationwide E10 ethanol mandate and its global implications, continued from page 2
Figure 3. China’s regional E10 mandate trial areas and 
ethanol refineries (annual production capacity is under 
location name)
  
2 Low estimate: assuming the current share of corn ethanol does  
 not change. Currently, China’s technology can covert 0.351  
 bushels of corn to one gallon of ethanol, Total increase in ethanol  
 consumption * domestic% * corn%=3.6 * 75% * 65% * 0.376=0.65  
 billion bushels. High estimate, all increase in ethanol output comes  
 from domestic corn-ethanol: 3.6*0.376=1.36
Since the ethanol price is proportional to the gasoline 
price, ethanol producers in China have suffered due 
to low oil prices. Before 2015, corn based ethanol 
producers also experienced high input price caused 
by the corn price support program. Moreover, 
China has gradually removed subsidies for ethanol 
refineries, especially those using first generation feed 
stocks. Although the policy details are not clear yet, 
the new national mandate is likely to be good news 
for the embattled ethanol industry. 
China has been importing substantial quantities 
of ethanol in the past two years. Before 2015, even 
though the imported ethanol was much cheaper than 
domestic ethanol, very little ethanol was imported. 
This is due to the government forbidding distributors 
to handle imported ethanol in order to protect the 
domestic ethanol industry. Starting in 2015, imports 
rapidly increased and reached almost a quarter of 
total supply in 2016 (225 million gallons), with 
95 percent from the United States. In that year, 
China was the third-largest export destination of 
US ethanol, encompassing 17 percent of total US 
ethanol exports. However, at the end of 2016, China 
increased the import tariff from five percent to the 
WTO bound rate of 30 percent, causing the 2017 
import forecast to drop to only 35 percent of 2016 
levels (USDA 2017a).
Potential implications of China’s national 
E10 mandate 
Currently, China consumes 40 billion gallons 
of gasoline and one billion gallons of ethanol. 
Projections show that by 2020 gasoline consumption 
will reach 46 billion gallons (USDA 2017). Meeting 
the national E10 mandate would require an extra 3.6 
billion gallons of ethanol, putting China ahead of the 
European Union to become the world’s third-largest 
ethanol consumer. 
Since details of the mandate have not been disclosed, 
it not yet clear how China will generate more than 
four-fold output growth within three years, assuming 
domestic production is to keep up with consumption. 
Currently, production capacity utilization rate is 
about 85 percent (USDA 2017), therefore a short-
term production spur can be achieved with existing 
facilities. Beyond that, a dramatic increase in capacity 
is needed. Since it takes one to two years to build a 
large scale Generation 1 or 1.5 refinery in China, it 
is possible that China will be able to construct the 
physical facilities in time.
However, if the current trends in consumption and 
production continue, China’s corn stock will fall 
quickly, opening up potential opportunities for more 
imports. If we assume that consumption growth 
follows the same trend it has shown since 2010, and 
that production decreases at its recent pace for one 
more year (to 2017/2018), and then stabilize (Figure 
4), the ending stock will  be used by the end of the 
2020/2021 crop year, even in the absence of the 
ethanol mandate. 
The ethanol mandate will further speed up the 
stockpile reduction. It will require between roughly 
0.65 billion and 1.35 billion bushels of corn per 
year.2 If we assume 0.9 billion bushels, (Figure 4), 
then the stockpile will be depleted by the end of 
2019/2020 crop year. If China wants to maintain a 
stockpile of 1.39 billion bushels, the lowest in recent 
continued on page 4
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Figure 4. China’s corn production and consumption,  
history and projections (Source USDA FAS data)  
Figure 5. Projected corn stockpile with ethanol mandate 
and import needed to maintain a minimum stockpile of 
1.39 billion bushels 
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history, it will need to import two billion bushels of 
corn by 2020–21 and much more after that. China 
may change its policies if it finds high levels of corn 
import unacceptable.
US corn exports to China resumed in 2017 after 
Syngenta’s Duracade trait—used in the US against 
rootworms got Chinese approval in July 2017. So it is 
possible that if China increases corn imports that the 
United States will be a dominant source. 
In the past, China has imported large quantities of 
ethanol when domestic production has fallen short 
of demand. If imports surge as a result of the E10 
mandate, the United States, the top ethanol exporter 
to China, will benefit. In fact, as this report is being 
prepared, it is profitable for US producers to export 
to China, even with the 30 percent tariff (S&P Global 
Platts 2017). 
Whether the ethanol mandate and other changes 
in China’s corn policy will result in additional corn 
imports or additional ethanol imports remains to be 
seen.
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Communication is key when cash flow is tight
By Steve Johnson, extension farm management specialist, 515-957-5790,  
sdjohns@iastate.edu
Cash flow management is becoming even more critical in row crop agriculture. While most lenders like to emphasize strong balance 
sheets, it’s the ability to generate cash that pays 
the bills. Some farmers did a good job of forward 
contracting 2017 new crop bushels, hedging or 
buying put options and will avoid many cash flow 
concerns this late fall and winter. However, those 
farms holding large quantities of unpriced crops 
could see cash flow challenges and may want to focus 
on understanding other marketing strategies and 
tools rather than storing bushels unpriced. 
Consider making cash sales of corn and soybeans, 
or delivering to a processor where better cash prices 
reflecting basis exist—do this as harvest wraps up 
and basis begins to improve. While basis should 
remain abnormally wide for December, most of the 
basis improvement for the winter months occur 
between mid-November and the first week of January.
Don’t wait too long to talk to your lender 
If you know your cash flow is already going to be a 
problem, communicate early with your lender. Many 
lenders spent the past couple of winters restructuring 
existing farm debt to stretch out principal payments 
and free up depleted working capital. These same 
lenders could be reluctant to restructure loans 
anytime soon without commitment from the 
borrower to improve their cash flow management to 
meet existing debt obligations.
Lenders more cautious on loaning money 
Most cash flow problems will appear by late 
December and January. Expect some lenders to 
require the use of the USDA Farm Service Agency’s 
(FSA) guaranteed loan program before advancing 
additional funds. Completing paperwork and getting 
necessary loan guarantee approval could take several 
months. Farms without access to typical farm 
operating loans should use caution before advancing 
family living and farm expenses on credit cards or 
higher interest-bearing debt.
FSA offers a low-interest, nine-month non-recourse 
marketing loan on harvested grain, but requires 
that the on-farm stored bushels be measured or 
the commercially-stored grain is under warehouse 
receipt. This marketing loan is limited to the county 
loan rates, which in Iowa are below the national loan 
rates of $1.95 per bushel for corn and $5 per bushel 
for soybeans. Thus, the marketing loan program is 
not a marketing strategy – just access to cheaper 
interest for up to nine months.
Shop around for better cash price bids 
It could take all winter and well into spring for corn 
futures prices to rebound along with significant 
basis improvement. Overcoming the higher costs of 
commercial drying, shrink and storage might not be 
realized in addition to the wider basis at a commercial 
storage facilities. The opportunity for better 
soybean cash prices could occur this winter should 
production concerns in South America emerge as 
they did each of the past two years.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of storing on-farm 
besides harvest efficiency is that it allows the farmer 
more time and improved chances to shop around for 
better cash prices reflected in basis. This will likely 
be true of processor bids, but not necessarily local 
elevators and co-op bids.
Consider delivering bushels in December 
With more farms facing cash flow constraints this 
fall, consider the delivery of bushels in December. 
By communicating with your grain merchandiser 
in advance, you can still “stay long in the deferred 
futures” using a basis contract or a minimum  
price contract.
Much of the actual cash price of the grain will be 
received upon delivery. Thus, you generate needed 
cash flow and eliminate storage costs, basis risk and 
accrued interest. You still have futures price risk in 
those deferred contract month – likely May or July 
2018 futures. You’ll need to work with your grain 
merchandiser to “short futures” before that futures 
contract goes into delivery in late April or late June.
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Updates, continued from page 1
Internet Updates
The following Information Files and Decision Tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm.
Corn and Soybean Loan Rates – A1-34 (2 pages) 
Condominium Grain Storage – A2-36 (3 pages) 
Hay Storage Options: How do they stack up? – A2-37 (4 pages) 
Hay Storage Cost Comparison – A2-37 (Decision Tool) 
Improving Business Communications – C4-71 (3 pages) 
Current Profitability
The following tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/outlook.html. 
Corn Profitability – A1-85 
Soybean Profitability – A1-86
Iowa Cash Corn and Soybean Prices – A2-11
Season Average Price Calculator – A2-15
Ethanol Profitability – D1-10
Biodiesel Profitability – D1-15
Communcation is key when cash flow is tight, continued from page 5
With large global ending stocks for corn, soybeans 
and even wheat hanging over the markets, expect 
this next year to bring continued struggles to manage 
production, financial and market price risks. The 
cost-price squeeze for many farm operations means 
tight crop profit margins and cash flow constraints.
